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MASS TORTS—MATURATION 
OF LAW AND PRACTICE 
 
Paul D. Rheingold* 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Mass tort litigation has been with us for about fifty years.  
This is dating the start from the MER/29 litigation in 1964.1  
This field of law and practice has grown year after year, and it 
shows no sign of abating.  At the same time, it can be said that 
this area of law and procedure has reached a mature stage; the 
practice is fairly standardized and earlier experiments have 
either become the model or have been abandoned. 
The term “mass tort litigation” (MTL), as used in this 
article, confines itself to product liability personal injury cases 
involving similar injuries from exposure to the same product 
and resulting in multiple claimants.  “Multiple” may be as 
small as a hundred, but may also amount to 50,000, 100,000, or 
more.2  Thus, excluded from direct examination in this paper 
 
* Member of the New York bar; LL.B. Harvard Law School, 1958, cum laude; 
author of PAUL RHEINGOLD, LITIGATING MASS TORT CASES (AAJ Press 2006).  I 
have participated in many tort cases discussed in this article.  
1.  For a discussion of the MER/29 litigation, see Paul Rheingold, 
Looking Back at the First Mass Tort Drug Case, TRIAL MAG., Aug. 2014, at 26. 
2.  There is no list readily available of all mass torts, or the approximate 
number of claimants.  One of the largest groups of mass torts is the current 
transvaginal mesh cases, involving well over 100,000 claimants, pending in 
the District Court of West Virginia.  See Shezad Malik, Vaginal Mesh Injury 
Lawsuit Claims Continue, THE LEGAL EXAMINER (Feb. 8, 2017, 1:42 PM), 
http://fortworth.legalexaminer.com/medical-devices-implants/vaginal-mesh-
injury-lawsuit-claims-continue/.  Larger still are two product litigations that 
both mark the early days of mass torts and continue to this day, asbestos and 
tobacco.  Both of these are discussed in the text below.   
Other massive litigations have involved the drug Vioxx (35,000 or more 
plaintiffs) and Fen-Phen, the weight loss drug combination (50,000 or more).  
The Vioxx litigation is described in SNIGDHA PRAKASH, ALL THE JUSTICE 
MONEY CAN BUY: CORPORATE GREED ON TRIAL (2011); and Frank M. 
McClellan, The Vioxx Litigation: A Critical Look at Trial Tactics, The Tort 
System, and the Role of Lawyers in Mass Tort Litigation, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 
1
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are consumer economic suits, often commenced in a class action 
format, and toxic tort lawsuits dealing with localized pollution. 
The most common product involved in mass tort litigation 
in recent years has been prescription drugs, followed by 
medical devices.3  Interestingly, however, the two largest mass 
torts, looking back fifty years in terms of numbers of claimants, 
have been asbestos4 and tobacco.5  The bulk of both of these are 
in the past; however, many cases remain, in part due to the 
latency of the disease these products cause. 
There are some ways to catalog and distinguish between 
various mass torts, which have led to some distinctions in law 
and practice.  One common division is between local and 
widespread torts.  Localized torts tend to involve a catastrophic 
accident (plane crash) or a disaster, either man-made (BP oil 
spill) or natural (Hurricane Katrina).  It is the widespread or 
national torts (a dangerous drug, for example), which have 
tended to drive the legal development considered in this article.  
 
509 (2008).  For a book on the Fen-Phen litigation, see ALICIA MUNDY, 
DISPENSING WITH THE TRUTH: THE VICTIMS, THE DRUG COMPANIES, AND THE 
DRAMATIC STORY BEHIND THE BATTLE OVER FEN-PHEN (2011).  
For more on mass tort litigation, see RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A 
WORLD OF SETTLEMENT (2007).  JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN 
MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND 
OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES (1995).  Finally, for an outstanding casebook in 
the field, see LINDA S. MULLENIX, MASS TORT LITIGATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (2d ed. 2008).   
3.  Using the establishment of multidistrict litigations, the active mass 
torts are divided into four categories: drugs (11), device (10), motor vehicles 
(2), and other products and substances (2).  See PAUL RHEINGOLD, LITIGATING 
MASS TORT CASES C.15.1 (AAJ Press 2006).  
4.  Asbestos litigation has probably involved more than one million 
workers.  It had its origins in the 1980s, and reached such volumes that 
courts tried to control it through class actions, a history that is reviewed 
below.  Asbestos litigation also led to a record number of bankruptcies, 
considered below.  Leading books on the topic are STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., 
ASBESTOS LITIGATION (rev. ed. 2005); and JEB BARNES, DUST-UP: ASBESTOS 
LITIGATION AND THE FAILURE OF COMMONSENSE POLICY REFORM (Georgetown 
Univ. Press 2011). 
5.  Tobacco—cigarette cases—also had their litigation start in the 1980s 
with class actions, which resulted in damages not awarded to individual 
plaintiffs.  That litigation is reviewed below, as well as Florida litigation that 
spawned thousands of cases.  Leading books on the topic are W. KIP VISCUSI, 
SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS: A POSTMORTEM ON THE TOBACCO DEAL (2002); and 
MARTHA A. DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE: FROM LEGISLATION TO LITIGATION (CQ 
Press 2001).  
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/6
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Another division of the cases may be made between those 
involving immediate injuries and those with substantial 
periods of time passing between exposure and disease—with 
so-called latent effects.6  The latter tend to raise statute of 
limitations issues and also, as discussed below, monitoring 
issues and identification issues (“market share”). 
Mass tort litigation is as much a procedural topic as a 
substantive one.  While there are some law issues specific to 
mass tort litigation, the greater area of development has been 
in the adaptation or invention of procedural mechanisms to the 
management of the cases in their organization, their 
development, and their disposition.  The three phases just 
listed—organization, development, and disposition–form the 
three main sections of this article. 
Given that this article is written by a practitioner, the 
analysis and writing is not of a typical academic style.  An 
academic analysis of this field of law is also invaluable, since it 
examines the activities with a broader, more 
philosophical/jurisprudential perspective.  The footnotes do 
contain citations to some of the many perceptive articles 
written by law professors.  Also, the final section of this article 
presents a summary of how the academic world has responded 
to the development of the field of mass torts. 
 
II. Organization of Mass Torts; Role of the Judiciary 
 
In order to manage mass torts, it is a given that they must 
be congregated in some way.7  Over the course of MTL, there 
have been some dramatic changes in the ways in which they 
are organized, as is next considered. 
 
 
 
6.  An outstanding example of latent injury is the development 
(sometimes decades later) of mesothelioma from asbestos particle inhalation.  
Similarly, in the diethylstilbestrol (DES) litigation, the DES consumed by a 
pregnant woman caused damage to her fetus, which was manifest only when 
the child reached maturity.  See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 
(N.Y. 1989).   
7.  “Congregation” is used as a general, non-legal term, in avoidance of 
the term “consolidation,” which has a specific meaning in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  See FED R. CIV. P. 42. 
3
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A. The Attempt at Using Class Actions 
The largest change over time in the organization of mass 
tort cases is the demise of the class action8 as a method of 
congregation.  In the early years of handling these cases, the 
class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (F.R.C.P.) 
23(b)(3) was the obvious procedural device for the organization 
and control of the cases.  All of the injured claimants would be 
placed in one class, and they would be bound by the outcome of 
the litigation.  Thus, in the 1980s, and up until the decision in 
1997 next discussed, class actions were certified in such cases 
as Agent Orange,9 Bjork-Shiley heart valves,10 and silicone 
breast implants.11 
On the other hand, some courts (even back then) found 
that the requirements for a class action under F.R.C.P. 
23(b)(3), including commonality and superiority, were not met 
and hence refused to certify a class.  This was often as a result 
of appellate decisions, overturning district court attempts to 
create a class, which sometimes arose of desperation to find a 
method of control.  Examples involved tobacco,12 blood factors 
(containing HIV virus),13 and the Hyatt Skywalk collapse.14 
All hopes of using Rule 23(b)(3) to organize cases came to a 
sudden end in 1997, by virtue of the Supreme Court decision in 
the Amchem case,15 which effectively barred class actions in 
tort cases.  This decision came in an asbestos case where there 
was a settlement class.16  Proponents of the class sought, under 
F.R.C.P. 23, to differentiate it from a class action, which would 
have been an original means of congregating the cases where 
the lack of commonality and other requirements most likely 
 
8.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  
9.  In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 145 (2d 
Cir. 1987). 
10.  Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992). 
11.  In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-
10000-S, 1994 WL 578353, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994). 
12.  Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
13.  In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
14.  In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982).   
15.  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1996).  
16.  Id. at 597.  
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/6
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would not exist.17  Rather, they argued that there was only a 
settlement class where there would be less individualizing 
factors and less difficulty in management.18  The Supreme 
Court, however, barred even a settlement class because of the 
numerous individualizing factors among the various 
claimants.19 
The Amchem decision, however, left open the possibility 
that a class action might be justified in the event of a “limited 
fund”—insufficient money to pay the anticipated damages.20  
The Supreme Court dealt with this issue three years later in 
Ortiz21  Here, again, a proposed settlement of asbestos cases 
involving a defendant without resources to pay full damages 
was presented for approval.22  The class was formulated 
pursuant to F.R.C.P 23(b)(1)(B).23  The Court, however, 
disallowed such a class, based upon problems in defining the 
class and in the asserted rights of individuals to have their day 
in court.24 
In the two decades following this duo of Supreme Court 
decisions, few, if any, instances have arisen where a class was 
certified in an MTL.25 
 
B. The Turn to Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) 
The congregating of mass tort cases into federal 
multidistrict litigation has increasingly been the major method 
of organizing cases.  In 1968, Congress established a scheme of 
coordinating before one judge all of the civil cases pending in 
the various federal district courts where there were common 
questions of fact if doing so would promote efficiency and be 
 
17.  Id. at 601-04.  
18.  Id. at 617. 
19.  See id. at 622-28.  
20.  Anchem, 521 U.S. at 614.  
21.  Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).   
22.  Id. at 827.  
23.  Id. at 821.  
24.  Id. at 864-65.  
25.  See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 613 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 
2010).  Nor has there been any notable success in creating a national class 
action under state law.  See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bryant, 285 S.W.3d 634 
(2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1098 (2009). 
5
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convenient for the parties.26  The Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation, created by this law, has the 
responsibility of determining if an MDL should be established 
and then picking the transferee court and judge to whom all 
cases will be assigned.27 
Over time, the work of the transferee judges (those to 
whom the Judicial Panel has sent cases) has substantially 
improved in efficiency, based in part on the experiences of 
judges who have successfully handled the assignment.  This is 
especially true with “repeat” judges, those who have multiple 
mass actions assigned to them.  Efficiency can be measured a 
number of ways, including rapidly establishing comprehensive 
procedures to handle large numbers of cases; moving cases 
through discovery quickly; and bringing the cases to a 
resolution.28  Faults sometimes associated with the MDL 
system in mass tort cases, however, are delay in preparation 
for trial and the costs paid per case for common benefit work, 
both time and expenses.29 
 
C. Mass Tort Handling in The State Court Systems 
At the same time that the federal legislature has been 
addressing the problem of many similar cases being filed in 
various federal district courts around the country through the 
use of MDL procedure, the states have similarly been adapting 
 
26.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2016).  For a full discussion of how cases are 
selected for MDL and the work of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation, see RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at C.3.  
27.  RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at  § 3:8. 
28.  See DUKE L. CTR. FOR JUD. STUD., STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES 
FOR LARGE AND MASS-TORT MDLS (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) (2014), 
https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/standards-
best_practices-exec_summary-final.pdf.  The Center for Judicial Studies at 
Duke Law School has been studying MDL practices.  It has issued various 
studies under the general rubric “MDL Standards and Best Practices.”  See 
id.  It has also held forums on the topics involved.  Whether there is a need 
for development of standards for the courts handling multidistrict litigation 
is, however, a debatable matter.   
29.  For example, in the 2014 NuvaRing settlement, common benefit fees 
were assessed at 11% (meaning that the contingent fee of the individual 
lawyer was reduced by 11 points), and the expenses at 4.5% (meaning that 
the client paid 4.5% of her award to the steering committee).  See RHEINGOLD, 
supra note 3, at § 7:26.50.  See also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in 
Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67, 131 (2017). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/6
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to mass tort suits in their courts.  The need generally arises 
when there are multi-county filings.  Here, however, no 
uniform approach or rules have been adopted; rather, over 
time, many states have developed individualized procedures for 
congregating mass tort actions within their state.30  As might 
be expected, some of the most advanced and comprehensive 
plans are in states that have seen the most MTL.  New Jersey 
is a good example of a complex system, arising out of the 
presence of so many pharmaceutical manufacturers.31  
California is another state example of a comprehensive plan, 
which assigns cases filed in various counties to one judge 
statewide.32 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers have been making their choices of filing 
in federal versus state jurisdictions by weighing a number of 
factors.  Some file in state court to avoid cases involved in a 
parallel MDL—perhaps to have more control or to save paying 
fees and expenses in the MDL.  Defendants are, of course 
unhappy about being sued both in the MDL and in state court 
(and often it is in multiple states), especially since this may 
require multiple witness exposures and other disclosures, and 
use of different state laws regarding what must be produced. 
The federal-state filings of the same mass tort have 
exerted pressure for coordination, if not full cooperation among 
the judges assigned to the litigation.  Whereas, in earlier days, 
federal judges inherently felt that they should be in charge and 
expected the state court judiciary to just tag along, a more 
nuanced arrangement is now often achieved.  The state and 
federal judges communicate frequently, and may enter joint 
orders.  The aim is to have discovery done only once, no matter 
where it is held.  On occasion, however, the state court may 
take the lead, having started earlier on the litigation or being 
independent-minded.  Those seeking the goal of close 
coordination have been helped both by the Federal Judicial 
 
30.  State court plans are discussed comprehensively in RHEINGOLD, 
supra note 3, at C.4.   
31.  Information on the New Jersey system can be found at 
www.judiciary.state.nj.us/mass-tort/index.html. 
32.  Information on the California coordination statute can be found in 
Corber v. Xanodyne Pharms., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2014).   
7
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Center33 and the National Center for State Courts.34 
 
D. Federal Legislation Relating to Mass Tort Organization 
Two federal statutes, designed to further coordinate and 
federalize mass tort litigation, have been far from successful in 
achieving their goals.  The more significant one is the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).35  In passing CAFA, the 
aim of Congress, with regard to mass tort litigation and other 
mass litigation, was to facilitate removal of state court actions 
to federal court by minimizing jurisdictional requirements.36  It 
was reasoned, by defendants, that if all the suits were before 
one federal judge, they would be more under control.37  CAFA 
legislatively created the concept of a “mass action,” defined as 
one in which “monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are 
proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ 
claims involve common questions of law or fact . . . .”38 
Once the language was added to the CAFA bill that it is 
the plaintiff who must demand a joint trial (compared to the 
defendant or the court), the usefulness of the law to the latter 
two entities was almost entirely undone.  To avoid removal 
(assuming that is the goal of the plaintiffs), plaintiffs’ lawyers 
do not ask for a joint trial, even if they seek to congregate cases 
for discovery purposes.  And even if they represent hundreds of 
clients, they file in batches of ninety-nine or less to avoid the 
100 case rule.  For the most part, with a decade of CAFA in 
place, few mass tort cases have been successfully removed to 
the federal system.39 
 
33.  There is considerable information available on the issue of state 
mass tort cases and coordination with federal MDL litigation on the website 
for the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 
www.jpml.uscourts.gov. 
34.  More information about this group’s work in mass torts may be 
accessed at www.ncsc.org. 
35.  28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2016).   
36.  RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 2:3.  
37.  RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 2:4.  
38.  § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).  
39.  Leading cases disallowing removal are Romo v. Teva Pharms. USA, 
Inc., 731 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2013); and Anderson v. Bayer Corp., 610 F.3d 390 
(7th Cir. 2010).  But a few decisions have, on their facts, allowed removal.  
See Atwell v. Boston Sci. Corp., 740 F.3d 1160 (8th Cir. 2013); In re Abbott 
Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 2012).   
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/6
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Another even-less-used statute relating to mass torts in 
the federal system is the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial 
Jurisdiction Act of 2002.40  Indeed, it is all but forgotten, 
having been involved in virtually no litigation in the past 
decade. 
 
E. Other, Minor Methods of Congregation 
A number of other means have been assayed in order to 
manage mass torts, but none have shown any recent promise.  
Therefore, they are reviewed very briefly here. 
Two methods involve a combination of substantive law and 
procedure.  First, there is the “market share” concept: that a 
group of defendants who produce the same product can be sued 
collectively, each made to pay for a proportion of damages 
which bears some relation to the share of the market the 
particular defendant had.41  To the extent the market share 
concept has found acceptance at all, it is in the very limited 
situation where the product is fungible and, due to the passage 
of time (for a latent injury), the particular maker can no longer 
be identified.42  No recent mass tort has been managed under 
this doctrine. 
A second potential method is the use of the “medical 
monitoring” theory: that a fund can be created for a group of 
persons exposed to some toxic substance to pay costs of 
monitoring their health to see if a latent disease associated 
with exposure can develop.43  This method has not been well 
accepted by the courts, and even at its best, could not round up 
cases of persons already injured.44 
More standard procedural methods of congregating cases—
consolidation of cases within one court pursuant to F.R.C.P. 
42,45 or joinder of cases pursuant to F.R.C.P. 2046—have not 
provided means of organizing national litigation.47 
 
40.  28 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (2016). 
41.  RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 6:21. 
42.  Id. 
43.  Id. at § 2:29.  
44.  Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 5 N.E.3d 11 (N.Y. 2013). 
45.  FED. R. CIV. P. 42.  
46.  FED. R. CIV. P. 20.  
47.  RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at C.5. 
9
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F. Financing of MTL 
The financial management of MTL has also evolved 
dramatically over the years.  In effect, it is now well recognized 
that the plaintiffs’ lawyers who are managing the litigation 
(generally a steering committee appointed by the court) “front” 
the costs of the litigation.  This is done by a combination of, 
first, capital contributions to a common fund, to pay for such 
costs as document acquisition and analysis, hiring experts, and 
depositions of defendants’ employees.  And there are further 
large outlays that fall into the category of “retained” expenses, 
where a firm pays its own expenses in doing common work.  In 
a way, this is no different from an individual firm with a single 
case carrying the costs of the litigation, pending the outcome.  
The law firms paying the expenses do so, of course, with the 
intention of being reimbursed at the end of the litigation.48 
Similarly, the plaintiffs’ counsel managing the litigation 
provide their time, as they would in any contingent fee case, 
without hourly payment from the clients.  Here, the 
expectation, based upon good outcomes in prior MTLs, is that 
they will be reimbursed at the end of the litigation, often at 
high hourly rates if the litigation is very successful.49 
The ultimate source of reimbursement, for time and 
expenses, recently has come almost exclusively from the 
settlement funds paid to the claimants (whether it is a lump 
sum to be spread, or a per-case payment under some sort of 
plan).50  The method of a settling defendant contributing 
separately to a fund to pay these management costs is seldom 
followed recently.  In advance of the resolution of the litigation, 
the MDL court will generally set percentages that will be 
withheld from each settlement to pay for the expenses and the 
time.51  Most recently, the expense portion has been charged to 
the client, and the time portion deducted from the individual 
 
48.  See Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 715 F.3d 417 (2d Cir. 2013); 
In re NuvaRing Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08 MDL 1964 RWS, 2014 WL 
7271959 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 18, 2014); see also RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at 
§ 7:26.50.   
49.  See infra note 52. 
50.  RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at C.7.  
51.  Id.  
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/6
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lawyer’s fee.52 
 
III. Development of Mass Tort Cases Toward Trial 
 
Once a mass of product cases have been congregated (most 
likely when an MDL as has been discussed), the next step is to 
prepare the cases.  This is conducted as one would prepare for 
trial, but it is done in the shadow of experience that most mass 
torts cases, as with all litigation, are eventually disposed of by 
settlement. 
Certain orders and procedures have developed and have 
now become routine at the start of a new congregation of cases.  
These include confidentiality and protective orders; the way in 
which motions will be handled, both on all-case issues and 
individual cases; and a determination whether or not there can 
be simplified service of complaints, or the filing of a master 
complaint, with individual plaintiffs filing a short-form 
complaint.53 
Over time, the preparation of the cases for trial has moved 
into a common pattern.  As to disclosure from the plaintiffs, on 
each case the defendant first will seek extensive written 
responses in a specially negotiated document often known as a 
Plaintiff’s Fact Statement.54  Also with this would go 
production of documents the plaintiff has in hand, and 
authorizations for medical records, tax records and other 
documents.55 
 
52.  See Eldon E. Fallon, Common Benefit Fees in Multidistrict 
Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 371 (2014). 
53.  The Federal Judicial Center has put great effort over the years into 
providing advice for judges to whom mass tort actions (and other complex 
actions) are assigned.  See, e.g., FED. JUD. CTR, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIG., 
FOURTH (2004),  
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/autoframe?openagent&url_l=/public/home.
nsf/inavgeneral?openpage&url_r=/public/home.nsf/pages/524. For more 
information on its activities, one may access its website, www.fjc.gov.  Some 
states have similar printed advice and website sources.   
54.  RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 8:9. 
55.  Id. at § 8:10.  Recently, the fact statement demanded from each 
plaintiff is now balanced by a similar demand from the defendant, often 
known as a Defendant’s Fact Statement, which seeks information in its 
possession about the plaintiff’s specific case.  In drug litigation, an example 
would be contacts the defendant had with the prescriber of the medicine for 
11
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As far as disclosure from the defendant, the plaintiffs’ 
discovery team will, today, automatically seek the defendant’s 
business records.  These days, these records are almost entirely 
in electronic form, and issues inevitably arise about how they 
will be searched and produced.  The ESI (electronically stored 
information) fights are not particular to mass torts, but almost 
inevitably arise and are more massive. 
In mass tort work, millions of documents are routinely 
provided by the defendant to the plaintiffs’ group, which must 
then find a platform on which to house them, and a method to 
search them.  The long running task of the group is, first, to 
select the documents to be used in depositions, and then to boil 
them further to a list of “hot documents” for trial. 
From documentary discovery (and limited use of 
interrogatories), modern MDL plaintiff discovery from 
defendant moves to depositions.  Dozens, if not hundreds, of 
depositions are taken these days of the defendant’s present and 
former employees, often followed by non-party depositions, 
such as of physicians who did research. 
At the same time that the massive groundwork discovery 
outlined above is going on, supervising judges and the parties 
realize that some movement of cases to trial must be 
commenced.  The choice is to try all cases on specific issues, or 
try some representative cases on all issues.  In the latter 
approach, which is almost universally used today in MTL, 
bellwether cases are prepared fully for trial.  That process, 
which straddles both preparation and trial/resolution issues, is 
discussed in the next section. 
 
IV. Resolution: Trials and Settlements; Bankruptcy 
 
The most significant topic to be covered in this study of the 
maturation of mass tort litigation is how such litigation is 
resolved.  The many ways in which this may occur—trial, 
settlement, summary judgment, discontinuance, even 
bankruptcy—are all considered here, but as the litigation has 
matured, it has become ever more a game of settlement. 
 
 
the plaintiff.   
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/6
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A. Ways in Which Mass Tort Cases Are Tried 
When MTL was developing in the 1980s and 1990s, two 
distinct methods were devised by the courts for trial of the 
cases.  The first was issue or phased trials: issues in the 
litigation would be identified and one issue would be selected 
for trial first; the outcome would bind all cases.  Then, if no 
settlement arose, the next issue would be tried.  This process 
involved bifurcation of issues.  Examples of this method include 
the Costano tobacco cancer cases,56 the Beverly Hills fire case,57 
and the Watson oil refinery explosion case.58  It should be 
noticed that most of the cases that experimented with phased 
trials were within the territory of the Fifth Circuit. 
In recent years, this method—trial of one issue in all 
cases—has fallen into disuse.  Perhaps part of the reason was 
the question of what issue would be tried first.  Some judges 
evidently felt that the most contentious issue should be tried 
first.  If the plaintiff lost, that would end the litigation, and if 
the plaintiff won, that might lend itself to settlement.  
However, these procedures went against the grain of naturally 
trying cases together on liability, causation, and damages.  
Further, it was hard to find issues common to all cases to such 
a degree that one jury verdict could bind all claimants. 
Of course, one can try more than one plaintiff’s case at 
once, but one cannot feasibly try 100 or 1000 plaintiffs’ cases at 
once.  Thus, the almost universal method that is used today is 
to try one case at a time.  However, it is not practical to 
prepare all cases for trial at once and then select one at a time 
for trial.  Specific case preparation entails depositions of the 
plaintiff, of a spouse, of treating doctors, of prescribing or 
inserting doctors in the case of drugs and device; then retaining 
and deposing case-specific experts (on specific causation 
compared to general causation); and then Daubert motions as 
to generic experts; and then summary judgment motions.59 
 
56.  Costano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995), rev’d 84 
F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
57.  In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1982). 
58.  Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1992), reh’g denied 
53 F.3d 663 (5th Cir. 1994).   
59.  RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at C.8.  
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Instead, the practice has evolved of selecting a few cases to 
advance through full preparation.  These cases are most 
commonly referred to as bellwether cases.60  A small number of 
cases are selected and advanced, while the large majority do 
not move forward on discovery beyond the type of initial 
disclosures mentioned previously.  The aim and hope is that, 
after one or several trials, enough experience develops as to 
liability, causation, and damages, such as to guide the parties 
to an overall settlement.61 
How to select the bellwether cases is also a practical area 
that has undergone some development over the years.  One of 
the earliest and simplest methods of selection of the bellwether 
cases was to let each side pick an equal number and then to 
narrow the list down through defaults, strikes, or judge 
selection.  However, this has tended to produce cases that are 
at the extremes: the plaintiff picks a case with great sympathy, 
while the defendant picks one with many defenses.  The result 
may be the trial of a case which is of no guidance to the merits 
or value of the mass of cases.  To help pick a case where the 
outcome of the trial will be meaningful, more recently a few 
judges have developed methods to pick typical cases, rather 
than the extremes.  This requires the judge to become familiar 
with the “nitty gritty” of the litigation (which some just don’t 
do) and the court to select a case that is down the middle.  A 
third method sometimes used is for the court to pick cases at 
random, which may only slightly move the cases toward the 
average case. 
In extended litigation, the bellwether cases are often 
selected in waves.  A second, third, and even further round of 
cases are moved along through the preparation phases, 
perhaps a few months apart.  This has become a judicial 
method of keeping pressure on both sides of the litigation, as it 
increases expense and time to manage waves of cases.  The 
Vioxx litigation, one of the most massive of mass torts, is an 
example of the multiple wave process; since the cases were 
going to trial (and both sides were winning individual cases), 
the federal and state court judges kept up the pressure by 
 
60.  Id. at § 10:45. 
61.  See Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict 
Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323 (2008); RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 10:45.   
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ordering continuing waves of new bellwethers.62 
In roughly half of MTLs, one or more trials occur before a 
settlement of a global nature is arrived at.  The results of the 
trials have a direct impact on the amount of settlement, to be 
sure.  The Vioxx litigation is, again, a good example of how 
multiple trials can work to produce an overall settlement.63  
Initially, Merck, the defendant, chose not to settle; instead, the 
defendant put money into fighting these heart attack cases by 
litigating each as they came to trial.64  This occurred both in 
the MDL or in various state courts, New Jersey being the 
primary one.65  In all, before an across-the-board settlement 
was worked out, some sixteen cases were tried.66  The 
defendant won about eleven of these cases, and there were 
some reversals on appeal.67  With this unusually rich “data 
base,” a settlement plan was arrived at, which provided about 
$4.85 billion to dispose of some 35,000 cases.68 
Since the judge supervising the MDL has a wealth of 
knowledge about the litigation, it would be logical for that 
judge to try the first cases.  And while this sometimes happens, 
the matter has become the subject of dispute.  The statute 
creating MDLs states that a case not disposed of while in the 
MDL “shall” be remanded.69  In interpreting this law in 1998, 
the Supreme Court held that the transferee court may not try a 
case sent to it, unless with the consent of the parties.70  That 
was also with the exception where the transferee court has 
valid jurisdiction over a particular case because it was filed 
originally in that court.71  Another method enabling the 
transferee judge to try a case, even if it was not filed in its 
district originally, is to do an inter-circuit transfer pursuant to 
 
62.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also RHEINGOLD, supra 
note 18, at § 9:39.50. 
63.  Id.   
64.  Id. 
65.  Id.  
66.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text.  
67.  Id.  
68.  Id.  
69.  See id.  
70.  Lexecon v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 38 
(1998).   
71.  Id.   
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statute.72  Thus, in a recent transvaginal mesh case, the MDL 
judge in West Virginia transferred a group of cases to Florida, 
and went there to try them.73 
 
B. Settlement of Mass Torts 
As noted, group settlement of a mass tort litigation may 
arise before the first trial, as the bellwether cases are moving 
along, or after a few trial outings.  In any instance, what is 
discussed here is the type of settlement plan that is worked 
out. 
There is tremendous pressure on all participants in MDL 
to settle the litigation.  The judge wants the settlement not 
only to end the work, but also because the disposition of a mass 
tort is an achievement among the court’s peers.  The defendant 
usually desires this, so long as a global resolution is involved; 
that is, the litigation and its costs and time-consuming nature 
can be put behind it.  And the lead lawyers for the plaintiffs, as 
well as the individual lawyers, want it, too, in consideration of 
both time and money expenditures. 
The most common type of settlement in recent years has 
involved some sort of schedule by which all claimants will be 
paid.  Sometimes a grid is agreed to between counsel, which 
creates various categories into which an individual may fall.  
The grids typically employ the severity of the injury, the age of 
the claimant and other factors.74  Another common method is a 
point system, where the claimant may obtain or lose points, 
depending on factors felt to be significant to determining 
damages.  Some common factors are age, length of 
hospitalization, and type of outcome.  Under these plans, points 
may be deducted, often due to the existence of perceived risk 
factors, such as smoking or obesity.75 
 
72.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 292, 294 (2016).  Some courts have experimented 
with procedures to accelerate trials by trying two or more cases at once, 
either with one jury, or a jury per plaintiff.  See RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at 
§ 10.49.   
73.  See In re Boston Sci. Corp. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., 
Nos. MDL 2326, 2:13-CV-8669, 2015 WL 1395576, at *1 (S.D. W.Va. Mar. 25, 
2015).   
74.  The plan is described in RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, Stryker Hip 
Replacements, at § 9:39.85. 
75.  The plan is described in RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, NuvaRing 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/6
 2017 MASS TORTS 633 
Since the plaintiff must opt into the plan (unlike a class 
action where one would have to opt out), defendants offering 
such plans have, over recent years, utilized steps to try to get 
as close to 100% of potential claimants as possible into the 
plan.76  The most common step is to set a very high amount of 
participation, which, if not met, will allow the defendant to 
withdraw the plan (called a “walk-away” right on the part of 
the defendant); a typical quota is 95%.77  However, in recent 
experience, no defendant has “walked away,” even if, perhaps, 
the total number did not reach that, and to the author’s 
knowledge no offer of settlement by a defendant has failed on 
this basis. 
An added step to achieve near-total participation in a 
global settlement plan has been recent attempts by a defendant 
to coerce each involved law firm to put all of its cases in the 
settlement plan.  This practice has come to be known as an “all 
or nothing” requirement.  Ethical issues have been raised about 
such a requirement, since individual clients might have 
differing goals and demands, some doing better in the proposed 
plan, some perhaps doing better if they continued to litigate.78 
Although plans with an “all or nothing” requirement have 
survived attack, ethical issues still remain to be resolved.  One 
of the arguments defendants use in supporting such 
requirements are that a plaintiff’s firm will otherwise cherry 
pick its best cases and hold them out and put the weaker cases, 
which may form a large majority of the firm’s inventory, into 
the plan. 
Even short of an all or nothing demand, there is a lot of 
client coerciveness in seeking a high level of participation by 
clients.  Plaintiffs’ counsel tend to insinuate to clients that it is 
for the common good that all participate.  In this they may be 
backed up by support from the court, the plaintiffs’ leadership 
committee who worked out the plan (and will be rewarded for 
that), or a report by an “ethicist” that the plan is not unethical.  
Further coercion may arise from practices that the court adopts 
(supported by the defendant and plaintiff leaders) that place 
 
Settlement, at § 7:26.50. 
76.  See id. at §§ 9:39.80, 9:39.85.   
77.  See id.  
78.  See discussion in RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 14:13.50.   
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great burdens on any plaintiff who fails to opt in and instead 
wants to proceed to trial. 
The role of the court in supervising and approving a mass 
tort settlement has changed over time, too.  In earlier 
settlements, the judge played a prominent role in approving a 
settlement, perhaps as a hangover from class action litigation 
where the judge was required to approve a settlement.79  What 
is becoming more common these days is a private settlement 
between the parties.  The judge is kept informed, and may well 
have pressured the parties to compromise, but the court’s role 
in the end is limited to commending the plaintiffs to enter into 
the settlement.80  One motive that may be in the mind of 
plaintiff leaders when they opt for a private settlement is that 
they are removing the judge from a potential role of 
supervising the attorneys’ fees of the plaintiffs (and perhaps 
putting a cap on them).81  These so-called “private settlements” 
are subject to criticism because some degree of judicial 
supervision may be needed, and legal issues arise among 
counsel that need resolution. 
Before the topic of changes in settlement practices can be 
finished, several variations need to be examined. 
Where implants are involved, such as hip replacements, a 
two-tier practice has been developed for making payments for 
the injuries caused by the devices.  This is because of 
peculiarity of these devices, where there is often a basic injury 
common to all cases, usually the revision of the defective device 
 
79.  Examples where courts have regulated fee contracts of individual 
plaintiffs’ lawyers, with the suggestion that an MDL settlement is like a 
“quasi-class” situation, include Zyprexa, RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 7:47.  
Other judges have apparently believed that they do not have the power to 
reduce fees, or have decided not to take such steps.  See Alexandra N. 
Rothman, Bringing an End to the Trend: Cutting Judicial “Approval” and 
“Rejection” Out of Non-Class Mass Settlement, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 
(2011); Charles Silver & Geoffery P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of 
Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. 
REV. 107 (2010).   
80.  RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 9:69.  Since there are always going to 
be issues raised as to the claims, and some concept of due process survives 
even in private settlements, the settlement agreement may involve the use of 
special masters, who will hear and decide disputes.  While these masters are 
sometimes retired judges, they are not subject to further review, as would 
occur in the court system. 
81.  See RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 9:69.   
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(removal of the bad device and replacement), and then some 
additional complaints that may occur thereafter; these are rare 
but serious events such as an infection, a heart attack, or the 
need for a re-revision.82 
In recent years, defendants have, on occasion, used an 
approach to settlement other than across the boards nationally.  
Instead, they engage in what has become known as “inventory” 
settlements, approaching each firm representing plaintiffs to 
work out a settlement of all of its cases.  Sometimes this is 
done under conditions of confidentiality so that one firm does 
not learn what another is doing.  In that way, firms with less 
bargaining power or inside knowledge (such as is gained by 
having led the discovery on behalf of plaintiffs in an MDL) may 
not obtain as large an amount for their clients as others do.  In 
other instances, the defendant has not imposed any 
confidentiality duties; the plaintiffs are free to exchange 
information as to values.  This openness facilitates settlement, 
of course.83  This type of so-called transparency has been 
lauded,84 but in reality, there is usually no full availability of 
settlement values.  Leaders in the litigation do not readily 
share what their clients are being paid, or they may exaggerate 
what they are getting (sometimes to try to get referrals).85 
The inventory settlement may have its appeal to both 
 
82.  This was done, for example, in the ASR hip cases discussed in 
RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 9:39.80.  Every claimant who has had a 
revision received a base payment.  Id.  However, there could be reductions for 
the presence of various factors, such as very short use, very long use, age, or 
weight.  Id.  Then there may have been adverse consequences of the revision 
that add damages, sometimes called enhanced or extraordinary injuries.  Id.  
Examples include the need for re-revision, or an infection, or dislocation, or 
even a death.  Here, additional set sums are paid pursuant to the plan.   
83.  This was done, for example, in the Yaz birth control drug litigation.  
See in re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, 2011 WL 6302287, at *1 (S.D. Ill. 
Dec. 16, 2011); RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 9:41.50. 
84.  JOSEPH W. DOHERTY ET AL., CONFIDENTIALITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND 
THE U.S. CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2012).  See Chapter 5, which discusses the 
settlement in the Baycol litigation.  
85.  A third path, one which only occasionally eventuates, is that a 
defendant selectively settles some cases and goes to trial on others (obviously 
trying to pick ones it may win on compared to ones it might lose on).  This 
behavior is only a one-way station since eventually some plan must be 
worked out. 
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plaintiffs and the defendant, but it has its faults.  First, there 
is no judicial supervision with its potential protection of the 
rights of claimants.  Second, there are certain ethics pitfalls 
involved: the temptation is to take a lump sum for the whole 
inventory and then the plaintiffs’ firm spreads it among its 
clients, which is improper.86 
Additionally, as a condition for settling all of its current 
inventory, the mass tort law firm may be requested not to take 
on representation of new clients involving the same product, 
which raises further ethics issues.87 
 
C. Summary Judgment; Dismissal 
An MDL can, of course, come to an end other than by 
settlement.  The transferee court can grant a motion for 
summary judgment dismissing many or all of the cases in the 
MDL; such a motion can be granted, in some circumstances, 
where all expert testimony offered by the plaintiffs has been 
struck, as a result of a prior Daubert motion.88  It can also arise 
by virtue of a motion based on a legal defense, such as pre-
emption. 
Up until about five years ago, the granting of a motion that 
was dispositive of all or most of the cases pending in an MDL 
was a rarity.  However, there recently has been an increased 
use of summary judgment grants in MDL cases, ending the 
MDL without payment to the plaintiffs.  Recent instances of 
 
86.  There is a great amount of academic literature on aggregate 
settlements.  See Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of 
Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004); Sybil L. Dunlop & Steven D. Maloney, Justice is 
Hard, Let’s Go Shopping! Trading Justice for Efficiency Under the New 
Aggregate Settlement Regime, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 521 (2009) (involving the 
interpretation of Model Rule 1.8(g) of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct).  See also AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE 
LITIGATION (2010); Rara Kang, Working With The Model Rules: Navigating 
Ethical Dilemmas in Aggregate Settlements of Non-Class Action Mass Toxic 
Tort Suits, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 585 (2014). 
87.  See Ronnie Gomez, Ethics Rules in Practice: An Analysis of Model 
Rule 5.6(b) and Its Impact on Finality in Mass Tort Settlements, 32 REV. 
LITIG. 467 (2013).   
88.  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see 
also in re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 955 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. 
Tex. 1997), aff’d, 165 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1999) (where a grant of summary 
judgment as to all cases ended the litigation).  
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summary judgment granted on the basis of the failure to have 
expert evidence, most usually on the causation issues in the 
mass of cases, are In re: Mirena IUD Products Liability 
Litigation89 and In re: Zoloft (Sertraline hydrochloride) 
Products Liability Litigation.90  Recent instances of summary 
judgment being granted on the basis of preemption defenses 
are In Re: Incretin-Based Therapies Products Liability 
Litigation91 and In Re: Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) 
Products Liability Litigation.92 
 
D. Arbitration and Mediation 
A method to settle mass tort cases of occasional use is to 
set up a mediation center, or expert, who hears large numbers 
of cases over time.  The concept is that the mediator, through 
this experience, will have learned values that cases are worth 
(and the defendant is willing to pay).  In most instances, 
individual cases settled during this mediation process.  This is, 
however, a slow and expensive way to settle a mass of cases.  
The chief value of the mediation process, here, has been that 
once some values are set—what plaintiffs will take and what 
defendants will pay—a comprehensive settlement plan may be 
developed, as described above.93 
Mediation has also been used recently as a means of 
 
89.  In Re: Mirena IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 202 F. Supp. 3d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 
2016).  The court first struck the testimony of all of plaintiffs’ experts that 
sought to relate the embedment of this intrauterine device to defects in 
design, and then granted summary judgment.  Id. at 328.  The decision is on 
appeal. 
90.  In re Zoloft (Sertraline hydrochloride) Prods. Liab. Litig., 176 F. 
Supp. 3d 483 (E.D. Pa. 2016).  Summary judgment was awarded to the 
defendant in almost all cases pending in the MDL in 2016 based on a failure 
of expert evidence to prove that the drug, when taken by pregnant women, 
causes birth defects.  Id. at 500-01.  The decision is on appeal.  
91.  In Re: Incretin-Based Therapies Prods. Liab. Litig., 142 F. Supp. 3d 
1108 (S.D. Cali. 2015).  The decision is on appeal.  
92.  In Re: Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium): Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-08 
(JAP) (LHG), 2014 WL 1266994 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2014).  On appeal to the 
Third Circuit, the Court reversed the dismissal and held that whether there 
was preemption or not was a fact issue for the jury.  See In Re: Fosamax 
(Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 14-1900 et al., 2017 WL 
1075047, at *24 (3d Cir. Mar. 22, 2017). 
93.  Mediation was the beginning point for settlement of the Stryker hip 
implant litigation.  See RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 9.39:85.   
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disposing of individual, hard-to-settle cases.  Sometimes, the 
judge who is supervising the overall litigation will lend a hand 
doing this at the tail end of the litigation.94 
 
E. Bankruptcy 
A substantial method of resolving claims, in terms of 
volume of cases disposed of, is via bankruptcy.  If the defendant 
has chosen to go into bankruptcy, usually Chapter 11,95 the 
mass tort claims against it are carried into the bankruptcy as 
claims, under well worked out but complex procedures.96  This 
resolution method was extremely popular in the asbestos 
litigation, where over 100 companies have gone through 
bankruptcies.97  This has led to the creation of trusts to pay 
claims.98  This was also true in the ephedra litigation, where 
many small companies were defendants.99 
But often the defendant is too big to go into bankruptcy, 
and in any case the parties may prefer that the company stay 
in business and continue to make money to pay settlements, or 
to sell itself as a going entity. 
 
V. How the Academic World Has Viewed and Shaped the 
Development of Mass Tort Litigation 
 
While the practitioners and judges have moved along with 
handling the exigencies of often thousands of persons suing 
over the same matter, they have been studied by law professors 
and other academics.  This is not to suggest that there is a total 
divide, however.  Suggestions and criticisms by academics have 
had their impact upon the litigation, primarily upon the 
 
94.  Binding arbitration has rarely, if ever, been used to dispose of large 
numbers of cases in a mass tort.  In class actions, class-wide arbitration has 
been severely limited by virtue of a line of Supreme Court decisions.  See 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).   
95.  11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(a) (2016).   
96.  RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 12:2.   
97.  Id. at § 12:46.   
98.  See Francis E. McGovern, The Evolution of Asbestos Bankruptcy 
Trust Distribution Plans, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 163 (2006).   
99.  Note, for example, the Metabolife Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceedings and the Muscletech proceedings.  See RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, 
at § 12:53.   
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judiciary, which in turn may view the mass of litigation before 
it through some sort of jurisprudential lens. 
  Some law professors have tended to see mass torts as an 
aspect of “public law,” in contrast to individual law suits, which 
might be labeled “private law.”100  It is the mass of cases that 
transfers the MTL into the public arena.  As a consequence, the 
law profession, the judiciary, and the general public have 
concerns for what is best for the public interest.101 
But even then, there is no clear consensus on what is in 
the public interest.  Especially in the early days of mass tort 
litigation, writers expressed concern for the rights of individual 
litigants, which they feared were being submerged by collective 
or aggregated forces.102  Their ideal was claimant autonomy.  
Then came a strain of reasoning that the litigation was so 
overwhelming, that in fact a collective or comprehensive 
solution was needed for the public good.  “Rough justice” might 
be tolerated if an efficient system of doling out compensation 
fairly might be affected.  While the pendulum, in practice, has 
swung decidedly in favor of the aggregative approach, tension 
and concern does remain between these two poles.  Further, as 
the mass litigations get worked out today, both concerns for the 
rights of individual claimants, and the need for efficiency and 
expense reduction, coexist. 
A specific aspect of the academic debate has centered on 
the assurance of fairness in a settlement by assigning an 
important role to the judge supervising mass tort.  Since this 
was “public law,” it follows that a judge will not only control 
 
100.  See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.  
101.  For an excellent, up-to-date analysis of the issues raised in this 
section, see Linda S. Mullenix, Competing Values: Preserving Litigant 
Autonomy in an Age of Collective Redress, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 601 (2015).  Her 
article is nominally a review of a biography of Judge Jack Weinstein by 
Jeffrey B. Morris.  See JEFFREY B. MORRIS, LEADERSHIP ON THE FEDERAL 
BENCH: THE CRAFT AND ACTIVISM OF JACK WEINSTEIN (2011).   
102.  See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Tort 
Exposure Cases: A ‘Public Law’ Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
849 (1984).  Judge Jack Weinstein, a frequent commentator on the mass tort 
system, also discussed these issues.  See WEINSTEIN, supra note 2.  The 
American Law Institute has made several attempts at trying to frame 
recommendations of good law in this area, the main one being AM. L. INST., 
COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS (1994), 
which had little impact.   
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the litigation, but also approve any settlement.  Although mass 
torts have moved away from class actions, where judges are 
obligated to approve settlements, the professors analogize any 
settlement for a large group as demanding judicial review.103  
As noted in an earlier section, however, there has been a rise of 
private, unsupervised settlements. 
Another mass tort topic that led to considerable academic 
examination and writing has been ethical issues raised about 
how clients are kept informed about the litigation, how their 
consent is obtained to settlements or other major steps in the 
lawsuits, and whether plaintiffs’ lawyers are representing their 
clients’ interests, or their own.104  That is also a topic discussed 
in the practice section above.  In many recent torts, it is quite 
apparent that the lawyers are primarily looking out for 
themselves, and that they employ rationalizations that they 
are fighting for their clients in working out a multi-billion-
dollar settlement (with large fees). 
 
VI. Conclusions 
 
This overview of fifty years of development in the field of 
mass torts indicates ever more sophisticated methods of 
handling large number of similar cases efficiently.  This does 
not mean, however, that the cases are being moved along 
swiftly.  The mere massiveness of the litigation tends to slow 
resolution down.  Further, framed by the academic debate over 
the need to preserve individual autonomy, there can be little 
claim that individual case justice is being meted out.  Clients 
lack a voice and true empowerment in the workup and 
settlement of the cases.  Not only does the system take over, 
which might be regarded as a collective necessity, but as shown 
above, the attorneys take over, too, for their own financial 
recovery and power. 
“Rough justice” is the name sometimes given to the end 
 
103.  Linda Mullenix refers to these settlements as raising “troubling 
questions about fairness, adequate representation, and the merger of 
legislative, administrative, and judicial functions.”  Mullenix, supra note 77, 
at 611. 
104.  Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 
58 U. KAN. L. REV. 979 (2010).  
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results of mass tort litigation, in the past and today as well.  It 
may be that there is an ideal balance between efficiency and 
autonomy that is yet to be struck.  However, for now, the 
dynamic forces reviewed in this paper continue to make mass 
tort litigation function, although at a price, at least in the 
jurisprudential sense. 
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